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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSCIC Intelligence Panel

SUBJECT: Proposed Guidance from NSCIC to the DCI

1. The DCI's recent report to the President and PFIAB described one of the major problems facing the Intelligence Community in these terms:

"...We must improve communications between the policymaker and the Community. The problem of obtaining improved guidance from policy and planning levels is far from solved, despite the progress described earlier in this report. Additional emphasis has to be put on the need for policymakers to take the Intelligence Community into their confidence when they are formulating plans so that intelligence assets can be brought to bear in time to be effective."

2. In seeking to make progress on this chronic problem, the DCI looks for guidance to the NSCIC, which in the President's memorandum of 5 November 1971, is to:

a- "Give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs," and

3. Another, and related, function of the NSCIC is to:

b- "Provide a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer."

3- 4. To accomplish these goals, a number of proposals have been set out below. Essentially, they are designed to inform us how the NSCIC can help to guide better and thus be better served by the Intelligence Community, and to provide the DCI, as the Head of the Community, with appropriate guidance to do so and, secondly, how the NSCIC can provide feedback to the DCI on Community performance in meeting the intelligence needs of top policy and decision makers.

4- 5. These proposals are exploratory and advanced with the understanding that they can be modified or discarded.

I. GUIDANCE:

I- A. MAJOR POLICY GUIDELINES DOCUMENT FOR DCI:

In this proposal the NSCIC would prepare a document describing the major policy lines the NSC intends to pursue during the next year in each major region of the world. The document would also define the major missing information pieces; in effect, these would be the areas in which the Intelligence Community would concentrate its efforts to assist top policy and decision makers. This guidance would go far to assist the Community in establishing understanding the priority of requirements and in tailoring production emphasis accordingly. The timing of this publication to-be-negotiated-to would be such as to have maximum impact influence on KIQs, which would be the major intelligence goals reflecting these needs, and on other IC policy publications.

II- B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RECOMMENDATIONS TO NSCIC FOR GUIDANCE SHIFTS
IN INTELLIGENCE EMPHASIS

One of the persisting myths abroad in the consumer world is the belief that the Intelligence Community can collect anything. This next proposal envisages going to the NSCIC with given topics, for example, Soviet Military Capabilities/Intentions. In briefing the subject, the essential point to be made would be that the West has a fairly good appreciation of Soviet military capabilities, but has a-long-distance-to-go little capability to estimate with-assurance Soviet military intentions with assurance. At this point, recommended changes in staffing patterns abroad, estimates of funding required in various areas to improve our position, and other recommendations could be raised for NSCIC endorsement. Other topics, e.g., Narcotics Suppression, or Terrorism, could be raised. In these briefings, the cost to the IC of pursuing these activities versus benefits obtained

could be described, and endorsement of priorities (or recommendations for changed emphasis to other fields), could be solicited.

II. FEEDBACK:

III. A. CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRESENT INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

This is a ~~program~~ proposal for a program of ~~continuing~~ aperiodic evaluation of intelligence products by top policy-level consumers. It would involve the identification and critique, at least once a quarter, of specific ~~product-or~~ series of products in terms of responsiveness to these consumers. ~~We would envisage this as a serious and wide-ranging evaluation by the consumers.~~ In the case of each ~~product-or~~ family of products, topics to be addressed would include:

A. (1) GENERAL - PRODUCTION

Are substantive papers now dealing with the proper issues, that is, matters of compelling interest to top policy-level ~~the~~ consumers? Are major areas of interest being overlooked? Are they covering subject matter in sufficient depth? Too much depth, including minor issues? Enough or too much analysis? Are they too long? Too short? Just right? Are they clearly written? Are they objective? Are the products timely when the subject demands timeliness? ~~Can a consumer obtain a response in a reasonable time?~~

B. (2) TYPE - PRODUCTION

We are concerned here with types of production, e.g., current intelligence, economic intelligence, NIEs/NIAMs, etc.

Are the families of papers serving the top policy-level consumer? For example, do the current intelligence-type publications serve these consumers adequately? Are there too many? Not enough? Are they deficient in any way? How is the mix as between current and estimative intelligence;

should there be more (or less) of either? Similar tests could be applied to economic, military, basic, and other substantive publications.

In the estimative area, in addition to the general questions above, we would seek guidance on such questions as whether there should be more SNIEs, i.e., a "faster service", as opposed to regularly scheduled NIEs, whether the NIEs should be more reportorial than estimative.

6- (3) NEW PRODUCTS

Evaluation and critique of current production would also be designed to elicit guidance on whether new kinds of products are desired, ~~by consumers.~~

D- (4) OTHER-CONSIDERATIONS EMPHASIS AND EVALUATION

1- To the degree possible, evaluation of production would seek guidance as to emphasis. For example, should Latin American production be emphasized or downplayed? Should emphasis on narcotics, terrorism, economic, and other types of intelligence be shifted? Should emphasis on biographic production be increased?

III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

2- A. Can the IC improve its responsiveness by structural changes? For example, would it be useful to place an IC person in the Secretary of State/Defense office for early response to high level needs? By adding a small Intelligence Community element to the National Security Council staff?

3- B. Another avenue to obtain guidance for the DCI would be NSCIC critique of basic DCI documents, such as Perspectives for Intelligence, the National Foreign Intelligence Program recommendations, and National Plans, e.g., SIGINT.